Exceptions to the Fair Share Act Continued

As discussed in my recent post "Circumventing the Fair Share Act....Maybe" I think some major battles over Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act are soon to unfold.  Specifically, there are going to be some wars over the continued applicability of joint and several liability.  Though I am having research conducted right now on the topic, I am guessing there is no present case law in PA analyzing specific case facts that implicate the Fair Share Act's exceptions.  These initial arguments will probably turn, in part, on the rationale's of other court's around the country who have already faced the same questions.

One important case may be Merrill Crossings Assoc. v. McDonald which I have linked to.  The first step in determining the applicability of the holding in this case is to compare the language of the Florida Comparative Negligence Statute to Pa's Fair Share Act.  The Fair Share Act states, in part:

(3)  A defendant's liability in any of the following
        actions shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter
        a joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
        against the defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as
        damages:
                (i)  Intentional misrepresentation.
                (ii)  An intentional tort.
                (iii)  Where a defendant has been held liable for not
            less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all
            parties.
                (iv)  A release or threatened release of a hazardous
            substance under section 702 of the act of October 18,
            1988 (P.L.756, No.108), known as the Hazardous Sites
            Cleanup Act.
                (v)  A civil action in which a defendant has violated
            section 497 of the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L.90, No.21),
            known as the Liquor Code.

The pertinent portion of Florida's statute states:


(4) APPLICABILITY.-

(a) This section applies to negligence cases.   For purposes of this section, “negligence cases” includes, but is not limited to, civil actions for damages based upon theories of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort or breach of warranty and like theories.   In determining whether a case falls within the term “negligence cases,” the court shall look to the substance of the action and not the conclusory terms used by the parties.

(b) This section does not apply to any action based upon an intentional tort.§ 768.81, Fla. Stat. (1993).

The critical discussion in Merrill Crossings was the following:

We also agree with the district court that the language excluding actions “based on an intentional tort” from the statute gives effect to a public policy that negligent tortfeasors- such as those in negligent security cases- should not be permitted to reduce their liability by shifting it to another tortfeasor whose intentional criminal conduct was a foreseeable result of their negligence.   See, Hall v. Billy Jack's, Inc, 458 So.2d 760 (Fla.1984) (lounge proprietor owes its patrons the duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable harm);  Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts., Inc., 382 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (the deliberate act of the rapist and murderer did not constitute an independent intervening cause which would insulate the landlord from liability for failing to provide reasonable security measures);  see also Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985);  Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc., 394 So.2d 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981);  Rosier v. Gainesville Inns Associates, Ltd., 347 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (a landlord's breach of an implied duty to provide locks and maintain common areas in safe condition may render landlord liable to the tenant for injuries resulting from unauthorized entry and criminal acts within the premises).  

The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, “If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”   Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 449 (1965).   Thus, it would be irrational to allow a party who negligently fails to provide reasonable security measures to reduce its liability because there is an intervening intentional tort, where the intervening intentional tort is exactly what the security measures are supposed to protect against....and Boom goes the dynamite.

The Florida law, different from the Fair Share Act, states “In determining whether a case falls within the term ‘negligence cases,’ [such that comparative fault would be required] the court shall look to the substance of the action and not the conclusory terms used by the parties.”   So when looking “to the substance of the action and not the conclusory terms used by the parties,” the Court held that the substance of a negligent security case is an intentional tort, not just negligence.   The Court then pointed out that in limiting apportionment to negligence cases, the Florida legislature expressly excluded actions “based upon an intentional tort.” Pennsylvania's statute does the same thing! The drafters did not say including an intentional tort;  or alleging an intentional tort;  or against parties charged with an intentional tort.   The words chosen, “based upon an intentional tort,” imply to us the necessity to inquire whether the entire action against or involving multiple parties is founded or constructed on an intentional tort.   In other words, the issue is whether an action comprehending one or more negligent torts actually has at its core an intentional tort by someone.

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Salon Shooting Raises Interesting Legal Issues Regarding Negligent Security Lawsuits

As you can tell I am slightly obsessed, as of late, with negligent security lawsuits in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  This is due, in part, because I am handling a number of negligent security suits right now.  But I am really interested in them because they raise a number of interesting legal issues.  For instance in my last post "Circumventing the Fair Share Act" I discussed how the unique nature of negligent security cases may create opportunities for plaintiffs to skirt the abolishment of  joint and several liability to help get their fair share.  But the concepts of duty, foreseeability, responsibility to keep abreast of local crime statistics and many other issues can also arise as we see in the case of Carter, et al. vs. Barnes, et al.

Carter was a consolidated action brought by three male plaintiffs against a shopping center owner, property manager and operator of a hair salon where the plaintiffs were shot in a 1993 armed robbery. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to take adequate security measures which would have prevented the likelihood of foreseeable crime at the shopping center. The defendants denied that the crime was foreseeable and maintained that the standard of care does not require enhanced security measures at small shopping centers such as the one in question.

The plaintiffs, all in their 30's, were customers in the defendant hair salon in Penn Hills (outside Pittsburgh) at 7:00 P.M. on a February evening, right around the salon's closing time. As an employee opened the locked door to allow a customer to exit, two assailants pushed their way into the salon. One assailant was carrying a sawed-off shotgun and the other was holding a handgun, according to the testimony offered. The three plaintiffs testified that they tried to escape with two employees through a side door, but the side door was locked with no key available. The plaintiffs alleged that the side door lacked a proper panic lock that would have allowed their escape.

The plaintiffs and the two employees ran to a back closet to hide. However, one of the assailants kicked the door open and demanded money. Either the assailant was given no money or too little money and fired one round from the shotgun into the five people crowed in the storage closet. The assailants were not apprehended.

The plaintiffs' security expert testified that the hair salon was located in a high crime area, placing the defendant's on notice of prior crimes and creating a need for enhanced lighting, patrolling security guards and surveillance cameras.

The first plaintiff, Michael Carter, put his left forearm up to shield himself from the gunshot and suffered severe forearm damage requiring major surgery. He underwent a bone graft from his hip and has been left with permanent scarring and deformity, according to his orthopedic surgeon. Carter was an overseas operator with a telephone company at the time of the shooting and claimed that he is unable to return to that employment.

The other two plaintiffs received minimal injuries. One, Marcel Craig, sustained pellet wounds which resolved. The third plaintiff, James Atkins, backed into a mirror and suffered lacerations to his back which required stitches.

The defendants' security expert testified that the shooting was not foreseeable. This expert opined that although there had been prior crimes in the area, there was not enough evidence of this type of crime to put the defendants on notice regarding the shooting. The defendants' expert also testified that security standards for shopping malls can not be applied to small shopping centers such as the one in question.

The defendant tenant testified that she felt safe in her hair salon and that two of her children worked there. The defense argued that there was no need for security guards and that the lighting was adequate. The defendants claimed that they were not aware of the prior crimes which occurred in the vicinity.

The defense also disputed the extent of Michael Carter's future diminished earning capacity. The defense argued that Carter had other transferable skills, was under no medical restrictions and could earn a salary comparable to his earnings before the shooting.

After a three to four-hour deliberation, the jury found that the defendants were not negligent by a 10-2 vote.

Not surprisingly, this negligent security case carried a significant emotional aspect and involved innocent victims who had endured the horrible nightmare of being trapped in a small closet and then shot at close range.

To hold the defendant landowner responsible for the criminal acts of third parties under the Restatement of Torts, the plaintiffs bore the burden to establish that the common areas of the small shopping center were made an attractive site for robbers and that the crime was foreseeable due to the lack of appropriate security measures. The problem was that the plaintiffs' security expert testified that he could not say for certain that the suggested security measures would have prevented the crime, only that such measures would have made the crime less likely to occur. The defendants maintained that they were not aware that other crimes had occurred in the area. A major trial issue centered on the plaintiffs' argument that a commercial landlord has an independent duty to determine crime statistics for the area where his business is located in order to insure adequate security. The Court allowed evidence of off-property crimes to be admitted, but restricted the type of crime which could be referred to...yet another obstacle plaintiffs must navigate in these peculiar cases.

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Circumventing the Fair Share Act....Maybe

I just wrote about the implications of Pennsylvania's "Fair Share" Act in my post "Exceptions to the New 'Fair Share' Act."  In this post I explained how this new law could hurt plaintiffs injured in Pittsburgh and also various exceptions that were left in place preserving joint and several liability.

Now I just read an interesting article titled "Apportionment of Liability in Inadequate Security Cases."  The article discussed the distinction between intentional and negligent acts that inevitably arises in most negligent security cases. The issue that caught my attention was the proposition that a court cannot compare negligent and intentional conduct. Therefore, when a victim sues a premises owner for negligence, that owner is not allowed to shift blame to an intentional tortfeasor.  This got me thinking...

See under the Fair Share Act bill, defendants found to be less than 60 percent at fault would not have to pay more than their share of the damages, except for awards in circumstances including intentional misrepresentation, an intentional act, an environmental crime or a liquor law violation. The Fair Share Act is law added to the existing Comparative Negligence Statute which you can read by clicking on this sentence.

On first read I was left with the obvious understanding that if a party was found liable for an intentional act joint and several liability would still apply and they could be held responsible for the entire verdict.  But what about a case where there is one party that is found negligent and another found to have acted intentionally?  Could it be that the negligent party would be prohibited from apportioning fault on the intentional actor?  For example, the Florida Supreme Court recently held in Merrill Crossings Associates v. McDonald that the apportionment of fault statute (similar to PA's comparative negligence statute) was inapplicable and that it was not proper to compare the acts of an intentional actor to the negligence of the tortfeasor who is charged with preventing the incident.  It is critical to note that the court based its ruling on a finding that a tort-reform statute enacted to abrogate joint and several liability was inapplicable to actions based on intentional torts.  That sounds a lot like the purpose of the exceptions laid out in the Fair Share Act to me.

For any attorneys perusing this blog (Is there anyone out there?) I would be curious to hear your take on this.  I have a feeling I will be doing a lot more research and arguing on this subject in the near future.

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Malpractice Verdict Hinges On Late Entry In Notes

I have been asked to handle a Pittsburgh medical malpractice lawsuit involving a negligent discharge of an elderly patient suffering from pneumonia.  As I always do, I have tried to research other cases that have gone to verdict with a similar fact pattern.  Nothing so far, at least in Allegheny County, is dead on point but I did find the case of Bryner v. Opy et al.

The estate of the 55-year-old male decedent brought this medical malpractice action against two family physicians and their professional association. The plaintiff claimed that the decedent's death resulted from the defendants' failure to provide prompt treatment for pneumonia and pulmonary fluid buildup. The defendants argued that the decedent was advised to go to a hospital, but refused to do so.

The decedent was an insulin-dependent diabetic. The testimony indicated that he had been feeling ill for several days and called the defendant's office for an appointment. The decedent saw a physician's assistant at the defendant's office on July 30, 1998, as no physician was available at that time. Records indicated that the decedent complained of feeling sluggish, shortness of breath, high blood sugar by home glucometer and high blood pressure.

An examination by the physician's assistant confirmed reduced bilateral breath sounds and high urine glucose. A stat x-ray was taken. The x-ray results, which were reported the following day (July 31, 1998), showed a large left lobe pneumonia with a large buildup of plural fluid, according to the plaintiff's experts. The plaintiff claimed that blood work performed on August 2, 1998, confirmed very high blood sugar and a very high white blood count. Antibiotics were phoned to the decedent's drugstore by the initial defendant on August 2, 1998.

The decedent saw the initial defendant on August 3, 1998, still complaining of feeling sluggishness, shortness of breath and productive cough. Examination confirmed reduced breath sounds on the left. The plaintiff contended that this defendant planned to treat the decedent as an outpatient with the antibiotic Augmentin. However, the decedent died in his home approximately 12 hours later. Autopsy confirmed a large left lobe pneumonia and massive pulmonary fluid buildup that had collapsed the left lung.


The plaintiff's internal medicine expert opined that the sluggishness, shortness of breath, high glucose levels, known insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus and reduced breath sounds identified by the physician's assistant on July 30, 1998, required an immediate in-office examination by a physician or admission to the emergency room if no physician were available. The plaintiff claimed that the physician's assistant was not properly supervised by the second defendant physician. The plaintiff also argued that the same symptoms plus high white cell count and productive cough identified by the initial defendant on August 3, 1998, required emergency admission to permit I.V. antibiotics and I.V. control of sugar and electrolytes, which would have prevented the decedent's death on August 4, 1998.

The plaintiff's former employer testified that the decedent was a good worker and was earning approximately $ 40,000 per year at the time of his death. No medical expenses were offered into evidence.
The defendants claimed that they had advised the decedent to go to the hospital during a telephone call on August 2, 1998, and, again during the office visit of August 3, 1998. The defense contended that the decedent refused to go to a hospital. The plaintiff's widow denied that her husband had been told to go to the hospital.
The jury found the initial defendant 57% negligent and the decedent 43% comparatively negligent. The second defendant and the physician's assistant were found not negligent. The plaintiff was awarded $ 428,000, which was reduced accordingly. The plaintiff's net judgment, with delay damages, was $ 258,000.

The defense of this wrongful-death medical malpractice action hinged primarily on an assertion that the decedent was advised to go to the hospital and refused to do so. Of course, the decedent was unable to testify in this regard and his widow maintained that her husband was never advised to seek hospital treatment. The plaintiff stressed that there were no records made of any recommendations to go to the hospital or the decedent's alleged refusals to do so until after the date that the defendants were notified of the death, and it was only then that these notations were made. Plaintiff's counsel objected to a jury charge of contributory negligence, arguing that no expert testified that the decedent's conduct had been negligent or that his conduct contributed to his death. However, the trial court denied the plaintiff's objection, and the jury ultimately assessed 43% comparative negligence against the decedent, apparently accepting defense arguments that the decedent could have done more to protect his own health.

Practitioners can be reminded by this case, from a liability standpoint at least, of the importance of taking particular steps when dealing with a noncompliant patient. The patient's noncompliance should, of course, be entered completely and fully in the record. This entry should include the advice given, when it was given, the noncompliance of the patient with that advice, all explanations given to the patient attempting to obtain compliance including the importance of compliance, as well as any and all other efforts taken in an attempt to obtain compliance through family, relatives or through secondary communications by telephone, by mail or directly. The failure to make a complete entry in the medical record of a patient's noncompliance may lead to the inference at a later date that the noncompliance, in fact, never occurred and the advice allegedly given by the physician may have never actually been given.


With the physician in this case, the note of noncompliance was entered after the fact with the event, at a later time after the physician had been advised that the patient had expired. Entries made in a medical chart at a later time when a physician becomes aware of possible liability exposure because of the occurrence of an adverse event, by their very nature tend to create suspicion in jurors and lawyers. Entries made in a medical chart which are contemporaneous with an event provide strong evidence of what actually occurred, not only because they are made in a timely manner when memories of the actual occurrence and the events in question are fresh, but also because they are being entered at a time before any accusations of malpractice or the potential for malpractice are indicated and are, therefore, less likely to be self-serving and are considered far more credible. To the contrary, late entries made in the medical chart when a physician is already aware of circumstances which may reflect on his or her judgment or treatment, may be looked upon by a lay jury as an attempt to avoid liability after the fact by making the late entry in the record. These types of late entries can often have the effect of not only impairing the believability of the entry itself, but can also impair the credibility of the physician being accused by the inference created that he or she altered the records in an attempt to avoid potential liability. Share this post :

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Some Thoughts on Crafting a Demand Letter

As a Pittsburgh personal injury lawyer, I find myself writing a lot of demand letters to insurance companies.  Demand letters preserve the option of settling a case before trial.  I, personally, prefer to try cases but often times settlement is in the best interests of the client.  And the client ALWAYS comes first.

My demand letters to Pittsburgh insurance defense firms have evolved over time.  When I first started practicing, thrown to the wolves as I was, I would assume the defendant "got it" and would just write a one liner along the lines of  "my client will accept 'X' dollars to settle this case."  As a result, I got a lot of incredulous responses asking me upon what was I basing my number.   "Hmmmmm, I thought, well I don't really know other than that is what my injured client told me they would take" I thought.  I quickly realized that I had to provide more.  So I researched and dug and asked other people for advice and slowly started to develop a demand letter format.  That format typically consists of the following points:

1.  Statement that this letter, unlike other correspondence, is a demand for settlement.

2.  Facts of the case highlighting the critical points and how they might play out (as opposed to just reciting the boring old basic facts both sides knew from the filing of the complaint).

3.  Explanation of our key theories of liability.  If I have a strong liability case I hammer the point.  Be it a killer expert report, weak experts on their side, great witnesses, whatever.  I lay this on thick.

4.  Causation discussion...if it is a point in contest.

5.  Damages, broken down as clearly as possible.  The two overarching categories are economic and non-economic damages.  From there I provide a breakdown of specific damages within each category with an explanation for how we will establish them.

6.  Concessions- I think it is always good to concede your weak points.  No case is perfect.  Credibility is everything, even with your opposing counsel.  There is no harm in pointing out that you realize the defendant has a few good arguments.  This can help improve report with defense counsel and the insurance company and help them realize that you are not pulling your demand out of thin air. 

7.  An indication of what the bottom line sum is that we will accept in settlement with a clear indication that failure to work with us will result in a trial - no problem!  You have to be willing to back this point up however.  If you never try cases, the insurance company knows that and will give less weight to your threat of trying the case.  Yet another reason why I try a lot of cases.

Lastly, all of these points, from the plaintiff's perspective, should be peppered with the various critical themes of David Ball on Damages and Keenan and Ball's Reptile.  Defense firms are beginning to pick up on these tactics and starting to recognize how they will fit into plaintiff's case.

I am constantly trying to improve my demand letter writing through grilling defense lawyers I know and other seasoned plaintiff's attorneys.  This is my template now.  I am not saying it is perfect but it's starting to get the job done.

Fortunately, there are great attorneys out there like Ron Miller of Miller & Zois, LLC, with the Maryland Injury Law Blog who recently put up a great post on this topic with SAMPLE LETTERS....woot woot!  Please go read Ron's post titled Demand Letters to learn more.

I'll try and post some samples of my own in the near future.
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Exploding Bottle Rotten To The Coors

I am investigating a defective beer bottle case where a Coors Light bottle spontaneously burst in my client's hand shooting a shard of glass into his eye.  The NY Post covered a similar story a couple of years ago Beer Blast Case A Matter of Coors.  To my surprise, there are no shortage of exploding bottle cases that have been tried by a jury in Pennsylvania.  Once case I stumbled upon in my verdict research was the matter of Glock v. Owens Illinois, Inc., et al.

The plaintiff, Glock, 18 years old at the time of incident, filed a products liability action against the defendant glass bottle manufacturer, the parent soda company, the bottler and the retailer who sold the bottle of Coca-Cola which exploded when dropped, shooting shards of glass into the plaintiff's face resulting in functional blindness of the right eye. The defendant bottler, parent soda company and retailer settled prior to trial for a combined total of $ 588,000, and the case proceeded against the defendant bottle manufacturer as the sole defendant.

The bottle manufacturer contended that the product was not dangerous nor defective and, if found to be defective, the plaintiff's accident was due to the contents of the bottle, not the bottle itself. The defendant also disputed the extent of the plaintiff's eye injury.

Glock testified that he dropped a 32-ounce, glass bottle of Coca-Cola, resulting in an explosion of glass fragments which struck him in the right eye. The plaintiff's treating ophthalmologist and emergency eye surgeon testified that the plaintiff underwent several surgical procedures to repair the eye damage, but was left without functional vision of the right eye as a result of the accident. The plaintiff's contact lens specialist testified that a special contact lens may have restored some of the plaintiff's vision, but, because of the deformation of the front of the plaintiff's eye caused by the glass fragments, such a contact lens could not be successfully fitted nor tolerated, according to this expert.

Glock put on two glass safety experts who testified that the bottle was defectively designed for its intended purpose in that the carbonated beverages created a substantial internal pressure causing a danger of high velocity shooting shards of glass in the event of breakage. This danger could have been eliminated through use of a plastic bottle, or by fragment retentive coatings which were known to the industry at the time, according to the plaintiff's experts. The plaintiff introduced deposition testimony of an engineer who worked for the defendant bottle manufacturer for four years and drop-tested pressurized glass bottles to determine the potential of shooting glass. The plaintiff established that the defendant held a patent for a shatter-resistant bottle coating, yet did not use the coating.

The manufacturer's glass expert testified that the frequency of injury from flying glass associated with bottle explosion was very low and that, in his opinion, the design of the bottle was not dangerous nor defective. The defendant argued that it was not responsible for the pressurization of the glass bottle which occurred only after it was filled with the carbonated beverage by the bottling company. The defendant's expert ophthalmologist also testified that the plaintiff's eye injury could be improved in the future by new technology and surgical procedures. After a three week trial, the jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $ 250,000. Post-trial motions are pending concerning the award of the damage verdict.

The defendant bottle manufacturer in this products liability action pointed the finger at the settling Coca-Cola bottler and the Coca-Cola Company, arguing that the glass bottles themselves were harmless and only acquired a potential for propelling glass fragments after they were filled with carbonated drinks. The plaintiff's attorney, however, was able to successfully overcome this defense strategy by stressing that the intended use of the bottles was clearly to be filled with carbonated beverages. The plaintiff's argument in this regard was bolstered by evidence that the bottles were pre-labeled by the defendant for Coca-Cola. The defendant's case was additionally damaged by deposition testimony of a former engineer who drop- tested pressurized bottles for the defendant bottle manufacturer. This witness recorded the results of tests performed with fragment retentive coatings on the glass bottles designed to prevent injuries from flying glass fragments, making it difficult for the defendant to argue that it had no knowledge of the potential danger. Finally, it was shown that the defendant held a patent for a protective glass coating which may have prevented the injury, yet failed to utilize its knowledge.  Great lawyering by Plaintiff's counsel in this case.

One caveat in these types of cases concerns loss of the bottle in question.  When a shard of glass obliterates your eyeball the last thing you are thinking of is to preserve the broken bottle.  As a result, many defective bottle cases are compromised by the loss of key evidence.  BUT...never fear, instead of bringing a claim for a defect in that specific bottle, a plaintiff can broaden their allegation to argue that all the bottles in a given batch were defectively designed.  This allows other bottles to be tested in lieu of the missing product and let's the plaintiff's case move forward.

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Burger King Spit Ball Leads to Emotional Distress Claim

Infliction of emotional distress, as I've written about several times, is a difficult claim to establish in Pennsylvania.  Pittsburgh personal injury attorneys are often confronted with clients shaken from their various ordeals wanting to bring claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.  As I noted in my earlier post Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania courts do recognize actions for infliction of emotional distress, but only in very egregious cases.

Now a suit has been filed in the state of Washington concerning a hamburger that had been spat upon by an employee of Burger King.  Plaintiff developed an uneasy feeling after receiving a Whopper with cheese.  When he lifted the bun, he saw a "slimy, clear and white phlegm glob" on the burger.  The glob was tested and was a DNA match with one of Burger King's employees, who pled guilty to felony assault.  Plaintiff claims ongoing emotional distress.  The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Burger King.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question:  “Does the Washington Product Liability Act permit relief for the emotional distress damages, in the absence of physical injury, caused to the direct purchaser by being served and touching, but not consuming, a contaminated food product?”  This resulted in the Ninth Circuit court of appeals certifying a question to the Washington Supreme Court. 

The big question, as if often the case in Pennsylvania, is whether you can recover for emotional distress if you did not suffer any physical injury.  In Pennsylvania, to recover for psychic injuries, you typically have to establish that you entered psychiatric treatment for the condition developed from the emotional incident.  Testimony from a licensed therapist, psychologist or psychiatrist is often the threshold of whether a claim for emotional distress succeeds or fails.  Arguably the individual in the Burger King case could argue that they did suffer physical damage evidenced by the sickness (possibly ongoing) they felt in their stomach.  But the real damages would lie in whether this person can establish that they incurred some type of post traumatic stress disorder.  It will be interesting to see how this case progresses.  You can read more about this case at the ABA Journal's article Can Cop Get Emotional Distress Damages for Spit on Burger? Share this post :

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